The paper provides an overview of the current situation in the socio-human sciences, which is characterised by attempts to overcome traditional one-sided approaches and look for new alternatives. One of the latest alternatives to traditional approaches in the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences is the "practice turn". It is the turn to another, non-traditional approach to practice but also to Aristotelian phronesis. The author gives an account of three main tenets of this turn with reference to both ancient Greek and modern conceptions of practice.
Introduction
The current situation in the socio-human sciences, although regarded as a crisis by some people, is characterised by attempts to overcome traditional one-sided approaches and look for new alternatives (Benton, Craib 2001; Delanty, Strydom 2003) . On the one hand, we are dealing with the end of a search for a "unifying or dominating paradigm", and, on the other hand, with openness to a "creative game" with all its interesting and vital components in the name of a better re-interpretation of social events. The quest for new approaches does not mean withdrawing from science and relying on the postmodern "anything goes" motto but rather attempting to overcome the dichotomy of two and/or three cultures on the basis of the specificity of the social sciences as a prospective way out of the current situation. 1 The term "socio-human sciences" used here denotes the whole complex of contemporary social sciences and the humanities. The term helps to avoid their frequent and unclear confusion as well as their separation. This term expresses that 1. The humanities understand humans as social and cultural beings and abstract from the biological element-they explore the socio-cultural being of humans; 2. The social sciences study human society, not biological communities. To study humans outside society is equally wrong as forgetting, when studying society, that it is human society. This unity is expressed by the term "socio-human sciences". That is why sciences about humans cannot be separated from the sciences about society. A relative border line between the social and human sciences is the boundary between macro-and micro-levels: the social sciences give account of the macro-level of human existence, whereas the humanities provide an image of its micro-level. HUMAN AFFAIRS 19, 378-396, 2009 DOI: 10.2478 One of the latest alternatives to traditional approaches in the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences is the "practice turn" (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, von Savigny 2001; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Stern 2003) . It is the turn to another, non-traditional approach to practice but also to Aristotle's phronesis as practical rationality and wisdom. 2 The Issue of the Goal of Socio-Human Sciences
We can approach socio-human knowledge and science from the perspective of theoretical reason (theory)-which is in fact the traditional and ever-dominant approach based on the classical ancient division of human action into "theoria" and "praxis"; knowledge (noesis) and science (epistéme) belong to "theoria"-and from the point of view of the classical modern idea of the unity of science, within the framework of which the domain of the social and the human differ from other areas of knowing (natural and technical) only through its subject; however, all other issues, mainly methods and goals, are the same for all sciences. These two perspectives show that the socio-human sciences cannot principally go beyond the overall scope and are basically shaped according to a uniform scientific pattern. It was not until the 19th century when the hermeneutic turn, prepared by Schleiermacher and the neo-Kantians, was implemented by Dilthey and developed on a greater scale in the 20th century by M. Weber as well as by some other renowned representatives of a variety of interpretivism (A. Schutz, P. Winch), but particularly owing to the interpretative turn of H. G. Gadamer (see Hiley, Bohman, Shusterman 1991) that in the area of social thought and knowledge, the idea that specificity concerns not only the subject but also the research methods themselves started to become "domesticated". In spite of all these methodological turns, one goal remains untouched-all the sciences, including the socio-human sciences, are the domain of the theoretical (reason) and their objective is the (theoretical) truth with its history, individuality, concreteness, etc. The aim of the social and human sciences is also basically to follow through an explanation and/or understanding of the subject and articulate it in a theory that differs from any other scientific (natural) theory, e.g. in the fact that it is not only an explanation of the causes but also an interpretation of social and historical events, institutions, norms, intentions, meanings and consequences of human action. By analogy, like all other scientific (natural science) knowledge whose goal, at least from the time of F. Bacon, is not just knowledge itself but its usefulness and serviceability in the practical needs of human life, i.e. to be applicable in different areas of practice (material and manufacturing, technological, etc.) , social and human scientific knowledge should also form the basis and instruction for shaping and reforming social practice (economic, political, etc.) . The basic model of the structure and functioning of science as a whole remained principally the same only the social and human sciences have continually "lagged behind" and sought to catch up with other sciences. That has, however, never been satisfactorily achieved, although sufficiently sophisticated strategies and apologies were developed, which legally confirmed the difference in their subject and the corresponding methods.
The basic objectives: 1. theoretical knowledge and, 2. its application in practice remained untouched although many justifiably pointed to other specific features and elaborated strategies to prove the usefulness and practicability of these sciences. So far, the main efforts of philosophers and methodologists of socio-human sciences and scholars themselves have focused on achieving the highest degree of theoretical knowledge, i.e. its explicitness, universality, abstractness, discreetness, systematicity, orderliness, completeness and predicativeness 3 and then on finding the routes and ways it can be applied in social practice. The problems they had to face stemmed from the basic conception of science based on the traditional dualism of the theoretical and practical.
Let us try to look at the socio-human sciences in a different way-as if "from the end" i.e. chiefly from the point of view of their goal, sense or mission. We have to pose and examine the following questions: What did the ancient dualism of the theoretical and practical stem from? How did the dualism develop? Is this dualism insurmountable? What knowledge should the social and human sciences provide? For what benefit is the knowledge? In what sense are the socio-human sciences practical? Are there uniform, universal and ahistorical objectives of science? We assume that exploration in this direction will provide another outlook on the structure and functions of socio-human sciences.
On the Difference between the Theoretical and Practical
Solving the issue of the difference between the theoretical and practical is still a pressing one since it relates to the very core of our philosophical (and also scientific) identity, the "self-determination of philosophy per se", to what philosophy is, what is it good for, and what can philosophy do? Is philosophy merely a "pure theory" or can it also be "practical"? And what in fact is "pure theory" and what benefit does it have? How did the discrimination between "pure theory" and "pure practice" arise? And should we continue to maintain it further or not? What is the basis of the distinction and does it make any sense today? What are the consequences of this discrimination and what would be the consequences of ending it? Is this dichotomy universal and necessary or is it merely a Greek product that we no longer need today? How can we "overcome" it then?
Ancient Greek Conception
The roots of the original meaning of the term "theory" date back to Pythagoras: he observed that there are also people who do not hunt for money and wealth, or fame and power; they only want to look, watch, wonder, admire, to love beauty and the wisdom of being. Theoros was originally a spectator at Greek games and festivals and his preferred activity was to look and watch. He was engaged as a messenger, an ambassador sent out by the state to watch sports and art festivals. He was an honorary and distinguished figure, as was his position and activity (having nothing to do with modern lower-class onlookers).
Such an activity was not subordinate, degrading or inferior or useless. Quite the reverse: it was something higher, lofty even divine. 4 Such an "observer" was freed from hustle and bustle, from hunting and from the benefits most people are hunting for. He was freed from worries and excitements and thus also from temporariness-it was a human being's attempt to overcome his mortality towards eternity. Bios theoretikos was thus not an ordinary human life-theorists were led by their efforts to understand, by their curiosity, their desire "not to have empty head", but also by astonishment, etc.
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The tradition concerning the birth and preservation of the dominant discrimination of and use of the terms "theoretical" and "practical"-although it has Platonic roots-is definitely Aristotelian. Both Plato and Aristotle at first founded this distinction not so much on two contradictory forms or spheres of human action, but on the ways (forms) of human life. In Plato (68 A-C) the discrimination was along the line of soul/body: the contrast between them is also principal-lovers of the soul live different lives from lovers of the body; the latter focus on physical pleasures, such as fame, power, money, etc. The goals of the two forms of life differ: practical good is represented by pleasure (in Plato but not in Aristotle), profit, virtue, etc. whereas the theoretical good is (eternal) truth. A theorist lives for one goal (truth, knowledge, understanding), a practical man for the other (pleasure, profit). Aristotle (1095 b) distinguished, within an ethical context, "three main forms of human life": 1. "hedonistic life" (he considered it to be animal rather than human life), 2. "life in service to the state", 3. "life dedicated to philosophy". Within the political context he recognized two forms of life: 1. political and practical life", 2. "theoretical, contemplative" life (Aristotle, 1324a). In Politics Aristotle formulated the difference between practical and theoretical life more from the social perspective rather than from an individual perspective: the former takes an active part in the life of the city, the latter is rather separated, isolated from it. By joining these discriminations-Platonic and Aristotelian-the following meaning was established later (we have to say that, confusingly): physical, external and civic (social) life is "practical" and spiritual, internal and "private" life is "theoretical".
Aristotle (ibid., 1325b) introduced into philosophical vocabulary the term "praxis", in terms of a particular form of human action: "praxis" is human action in general with the exception of: 1. physiological bodily activities, 2. purely intellectual activities, such as thought and contemplation. Aristotle is not unambiguous here: praxis for him is also life, life activities in the broadest sense of the biological term; he sometimes even speaks of thought as of practical action. 4 The common root of the Greek words theos-theoros-theatros can serve as evidence. 5 "Pure theory" is then a product of Platonic philosophy and overcoming Platonism is a task unsolved in the history of philosophy so far. Rejecting Platonic "pure theory" does not necessarily mean rejecting the theory as a whole. A "link" between theory and practice that does make sense might be Socrates's anthropological theme of the "good life". "To know" what the good life is a theoretical matter. "To have" a "good life" is another matter-practical in nature. Obviously, to live a "good life" is a matter both theoretical and practical; it is a matter of the "art of living" in which the distinction between theoretical and practical makes sense no longer. Since the meaning itself (of life and of philosophy) is "to live the good life", that is the "art of living" itself.
Within the conception of human action, Aristotle distinguishes between praxis and "poiesis" (creating, production) such that the former contains the aim within itself; the aim is action itself-whereas with the latter the goal lies outside, in the product. The goal in the former is fulfilled during its performance; the goal of the latter is fulfilled after completion. Therefore, we do not want to cease doing some actions, whereas we do not even want to start doing others. We do not achieve some aims without some activities (work), whereas we do others preferably for themselves. According to Aristotle (ibid., 1254a) life is action, not production; therefore, if life becomes a means for something else, the purpose and sense of action change. To Aristotle, however, praxis is mainly an action that is political or ethical (Lobkowitz 1967, 11) and only an action of a free man. This is the origin of the narrower sense of the term "praxis"-in terms of human life or human affairs, human action is reasonable and single-minded, purposeful action because such is its subject. Behind such a praxis, there is the performance of the human mind or reason-conscious decision-making or option on the basis of demand and single-minded contemplation (proairesis).
The difference as originated by Aristotle is as follows: praxis is not only action, it is a rational action, i.e. action with its own rationality and thus also its own knowledge-the subject of practical wisdom that is the wisdom focused on action is the practical good and profit, not the knowledge itself. On the other hand, the subject of theoretical reason is not practice but truth and knowledge itself-that is, theory and practice, knowledge and good are two things: theory about practice (theory of practice) is not possible according to Aristotle; theory does not deal with practice, its subject is different and practice does not deal with theory but with its subject-the good and profit, because, even if we study practice, our practical objective is not to know what courage is, but to be courageous; not to know what health is but to be healthy, etc. "Eupraxia" is good action and from the practical point of view only the knowledge gives meaning to it, that contributes to it, and that is the "practical knowledge". According to Aristotle, the aim of the exploration of practical matters consists not in getting to know them, to know about them and to define them, but in doing them and in assuming practical virtues. Analogously, Aristotle differentiates between knowing and thinking-deliberation: the subject of knowing is variable, eternal substances and the subject of thinking is what I will do. Physics is e.g. a theoretical science, whereas, ethics and politics are entirely different because 1. The domain of practice is the domain of human life and has to do with individual and variable matters. 2. The goal of ethics and politics is to lead human action. This makes of ethics and politics "practical sciences" and therefore they cannot be "true" knowledge in terms of the knowledge of everlasting entities as achieved by physics. The area of practice, human action, is according to Aristotle (1137b) of a different kind and nature. We cannot expect here strictness and exactness as in the domain of science and physics. This Aristotelian conception contains an idea that in ethics and politics as practical matters such a scientific character and/or scienticism in the same form as in the domain of physics cannot be achieved. It is thus not wise to strive for it. Should we agree with Aristotle, or should we disprove it as many others after him have tried? Is it concerned with a "substantial lack" of ethics and politics or only with their otherness?
Aristotle's distinction between the theoretical and practical is thus allied with his understanding of wisdom and rationality-phronesis. The meaning of this word has been changing in the Greek language and in Greek philosophy. Analysis shows that in pre-Socratics the notion phronesis originally had a practical and ethical meaning (the Sophists even saw it as a type of "calculative rationality"), but Socrates gave it an ethical connotation and in Plato, who had melded practice to theory, phronesis relates completely to contemplation and remains within the limits of theoretical reason and/or wisdom (Aubenque 2003, 18, 21) . In the beginning, Aristotle also used this approach. In his Methaphysics he spoke of phronesis as a type of unchangeable knowing about the unchangeable being. Only later did Aristotle come to need to differentiate phronesis from traditional relative concepts such as nous, episteme, and sophia within the context of his contemplations. In his ethical treatises, chiefly in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes about phronesis in a different way: he describes it not as knowledge or science, not even as wisdom, but as an intellectual (dianoethical) virtue and/or as a practical skill related to the random, variable, concrete circumstances and actions of an individual (Aristotle, 1140a and 1145 a). Phronesis is according to Aristotle "rationality" in contrast to "wisdom" (sophia) and becomes a "practical rational virtue, whose essence is action" (ibid., 1141b). That means, where action (practice) is concerned, we need other virtues and skills in order to achieve our goals, viz. various forms of eudaimonia "own good", the overall organization of our own life circumstances" (ibid., 1142a). By this distinction of wisdom and rationality, which is an analogy of the distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom, Aristotle does not mean to place one above the other, nor to split them, he only points to the need to distinguish between them and to their particularities as far as their subjects and goals are concerned (ibid., 1144a-1145 a). We have to see as well that Aristotle's distinction remains within the limits of wisdom or intellect and does not go beyond them towards practice as real action-it actually concerns two different orientations of the same human reason with respect to its subject, goal and function: one "part" of this "reason" (intellect) is orientated towards knowledge (epistéme) in terms of understanding the essence of matters, which Aristotle calls wisdom (sophia) as the most perfect form of knowledge" (ibid., 1141a), the second focuses on action (praxis) in terms of achieving eudaimonia in life and the organization of life circumstances, which Aristotle calls phronesis. At the same time, Aristotle says that real action (practice) does not obey and should not observe sophia as in Socrates and Plato, but operates just through phronesis, i.e. the "practical" part of reason is more suitable or better adapted to action.
Aristotle's heritage led to controversies among his immediate followers (Aubenque 2003, 21-23) . One school was represented by Theophrastus, who believed that the human mind should focus on knowledge and wisdom and that humans should instead live a contemplative life (life of spirit, vita contemplativa), within which the "practical wisdom" is of lower grade because it contains "secondary knowledge". That is an outlook on wisdom and action from the point of view of knowledge and theory. The main representative of the second school was Dicaearchus, who was a resolute defender of the orientation of the mind towards action, i.e. towards active life (vita activa). This second view provides some of the following alternatives: 1. the replacement of sophia by phronesis; 2. the subordination of theory to practice, 3. the re-unification of theory with practice and the theoretical with practical reason). These trends were established later in the modern age. However, the stoics had already taken the first step towards overcoming the controversy between wisdom and rationality. They understood phronesis again as knowing about what to do to achieve good and avoid evil (Aubenque 2003, 43, 215) ; this leads us to the fact that the term "practical wisdom"-as some propose we should understand phronesis-does not have to be contradictio in subjecto. In its stoic rather than its original Aristotelian form, phronesis as "practical wisdom" returns today to the philosophy of the socio-human sciences (Flyvbjerg 2001, 2) .
Modern Conception
In ancient times the difference between the theoretical and the practical did not mean the difference between the abstract and the concrete, the thought and the lived, the spiritual and the material, the internal and the external (Lobkowicz 1967, 35) , although Plato's concept following the soul/body line created the prerequisites for it. Theory itself was conceived as a form of life, different from the other forms of life belonging to "praxis". The practical had not yet taken on the meaning of "real" versus the theoretical as abstract, even purely fictitious, existing only in the realm of ideas, contemplations, intentions, etc. because the "theoretical" was not in opposition to the "practical" as a dualism of thought and action: the theoretical represented only one type of knowledge (epistéme) and wisdom (sophia) within the overall spiritual life (vita contemplativa) (cf. Lobkowitz 1967, 42-43) .
Such a turn took place as late as the modern age. The turn meant the reorientation of all that was theoretical to praxis, i.e. the abolition of the basic difference between theoretical and practical knowledge and the fundamental demand to apply (use) all knowledge in practice; that is "pure knowledge" or "pure science" in terms of the Platonic view of eternal substances were losing their justification. At the same time, through the identification of a "higher" kind of knowledge in ancient times, that is, theory, with practice-oriented science (scientia), Aristotelian "practical knowledge" focused on temporary and variable subjects and human eudaimonia (good, happiness) became "second-rate" knowledge, which also had to begin to be promoted to the level of theory (epistéme) or science (scientia).
Modernity thus began to demand two things which antiquity at once differentiated between and understood separately: 1. a perfect theory in terms of knowledge of substances, 2. perfect praxis in terms of the application of the perfect theory. The pure theory no longer made sense, lost its value and along with it the pure contemplative life. Analogically, praxis itself unfounded by such a theory began to be regarded as something lower rate, secondary. It was "the unity of theory and practice" that became an ideal. It demanded: 1. the application of each theory in practice (either immediately or principally); 2. the founding of every practice on theory (either immediately or principally). It was in fact a new approach to theory as scientific knowledge, which was to serve that which ancient tradition had not requested from theory but from Aristotelian phronesis. Theory was even required to serve not only the praxis but also poiesis, that is, creation and production, which the Greeks had required from techné. In modernity, theory as science took on the place and/or function of both phronesis and techné but theory did not cease to be "knowledge of primary substances". However, theory that does not serve practice and production as practical knowledge and technology in the modern age becomes abstract and useless. If in Plato, all knowledge had focused on itself and in Aristotle part of knowledge was focused on action, nowadays the focus of all knowledge should be without exemption on action and practice.
The most important consequence of the modern scientific revolution has been the overturning of the hierarchy between vita contemplativa and vita activa (Arendt 1998, 289) . Although this "pragmatic" or "proto-pragmatic" turn of science-which has finally become a sustainable impulse for modernity-toward its own evaluation according to its "fruits and works" had its roots in F. Bacon, it has been dominated for a long period by Descartes' anti-Aristotelian conception. According to this conception practical knowledge is only probabilistic and has to give way to particular theoretical knowledge. Descartes, Galilei and Newton continued to understand it in a Platonic sense: science has a goal in itself and need not be verified and confirmed by practical profit. For instance, the watch was not invented for practical purposes, but for the theoretical aim of conducting measurements in scientific experiments and only then did its practical significance and consequences emerge accidentally. Paradoxically enough, if we had only pursued practical goals, no inventions of a practical use would have been created: they were based just on theoretical interests. On the other hand, it has been shown that knowledge and truth itself cannot be achieved only passively, by contemplation: we have to be active and experiment actively (Arendt 1998, 290) . Science became "practical" to as it became empirical-contemplation was replaced by scientific thought and the theory ceased to be contemplative. Thought became a servant of action just as earlier it had been a servant of contemplation and contemplation itself has become meaningless (ibid., 291-292). Within vita activa, work as a creation and product became winners (ibid., 294) .
This led to the following situation in the socio-human sciences and their philosophy: 1. to maintain the focus on practice, but 2. to achieve the transition from purely "practical knowledge" to "theoretical knowledge", which is more perfect and, from now on, its mission and functions are practical. The result was that this model did not function properly: in their efforts to elevate themselves to the theoretical level, the socio-human sciences became more abstract and began to lose their practicality. This process can also be called the "theorization" of the socio-human sciences in terms of their scientification, i.e. the replacement of the purely accidental, empirical or "situational" knowledge with something that is really scientific, i.e. with the knowledge of laws following the pattern of natural science or science as a whole. This theoretical or scientific ambition of the socio-human sciences is evident in Hobbes, Spinoza, and Hume who himself wanted to be the "Newton of moral sciences" as well as in others, including Marx, J. S. Mill, etc. The Cartesian idea of the possibility of the "theory of practice" was domesticated, i.e. the theoretical understanding and knowing of practical human affairs. According to the Greeks, in the socio-human sciences, such a theory was not needed and was not possible either.
What belonged to the domain of the "practical" (wisdom, knowledge, thought), i.e. the domain of politics and ethics (action, praxis) but also economic life (creating, poiesis) in ancient Greek tradition, became in the modern age an area (field, subject) of the socio-human sciences. The interconnection between the sphere of the practical in antiquity and the sphere of the socio-human in modernity is evident. However, there is a difference: in modernity the practical conforms to theory (science) and the theoretical (scientific) should serve the praxis; that means that where antiquity defined the practical as a different domain of reason or even as a different domain of action and life, modernity places the practical under the theoretical/ scientific according to several meanings: 1. the theoretical should serve the practical and the theoretical itself should have practical use; 2. the theoretical should study the practical itself as its subject and create a "theory of practice" but not so as it ceases to be theoretical/ scientific-something which had not been possible before (although this idea was already present in Aquinas); 3. the practical should be a test of the theoretical.
Modernity posed the following problem: if we are to examine practice theoretically and, if it is possible, should it be a theory whose character will be the same as the theory of natural history? The problem is complicated by a demand that the theory of natural science should in modernity be "practical", i.e. usable for human goals. But the issue in the socio-human sciences is different-it is a question of the "theory of practice", i.e. whether it is possible to understand practical human affairs scientifically in the same way as natural science. Behind this question lies the modern idea of the unity of science and the attempt to give knowledge to human action in terms of the revelation of the necessary ("iron") law of this action. In Kant, the problem was shifted to the level of normativity-to the establishment of the norms for action, which also has to be done on the basis of the scientific theory.
The Current "Practice Turn"
The contemporary "practice turn" builds on modern rather than ancient tradition. In spite of that it seeks to draw up a new Aristotelian conception of phronesis. The starting points of this turn are the theses: 1. practice is the basis of the theory; 2. theory should be practice-based and practice-oriented. That means to look at everything from the perspective of practice and chiefly create the "theory of practice".
The contemporary "practice turn" in the socio-human sciences is their re-orientation and escape from the dualisms of the subjective and objective (Stern 2003, 185) . Ontologically it means looking at social reality as practice and/or the sum of practices-even seeing social theory as a form of practice-and using them as a basis for social exploration. Of course, the explanation as to how we understand practice is then crucial. The current practical turn can therefore appear to be a "denial" of such a theory, as an "atheorization" towards the actual situational knowledge.
The issue is not merely the turn to practice in general, brought about by holism and contextualism but also about considering particular social practices (Goffman, Foucault), i.e. the turn from macro-theory and macro-analyses to micro-theory and micro-analyses. The shift resides thus in understanding the practice as such: practice cannot be a simply applied theory, the modern vision says, and theory does not necessarily have to precede practice at any rate (temporally or causally). It is chiefly opposition to systemizing and formalizing approaches in the social sciences that leads to this turn to practice and practices. It is an opposition to the old type of theorizing and offers a new approach to practice as the plurality of practices in terms of e.g. Wittgensteinian language games and forms of life. The new understanding of practice consists, among other things, in the fact that practice is not understood only as an application of the theory-not only traditionally as in Aristotle and Marx, but also in Heidegger and Wittgenstein within the context of rules, language, habits, traditions, norms, values, etc. Nor is the theory understood merely as a reflection of practice, or instruction to it that is separated from practice, but as an intrinsic part of practice and/or of particular concrete practices. Science is not looked upon as pure theory nor as suspicious speculation, which, from the rational-purposeful economic perspective recognizing only "material", financial and "business" practice, threatens to be a pointless waste of money. Science produces theory but it is itself a fully materialized social system and form of practice (i.e. "practice") of a particular part of society. Theory and science are not looked upon as being only a pure intellectual game and a matter of contemplation, which is something different, even contradictory to practice and other human action, but as upon a complex social game and form of life, with its own rules. Science is something that is always practiced within a particular social context. This new understanding of practice/practices includes not only live human action but also its contexts, conditions, environment, equipment, instrumentation, norms, rules, etc. It concerns forms of life, behavioural patterns, systems of norms rather than the fact that practice should be the "embodiment" or thorough implementation of a theory, which, ultimately, is never possible. Similarly as it is not possible to succumb social practice to logic, because it is "illogical" (P. Winch) and/or it has its own logic (P. Bourdieu), practice also has independent functions, not only the verification of the theory, although theory does not make sense other than aiming towards practice. But practical actors do not act and cannot always act on the basis of a theory, practical as it may be, but on the basis of practical reason, the habits, norms, and rules that are deep-rooted in the particular practice.
The proponents of this turn identify its roots in late Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Gada mer. R. Bernstein was one of the first contemporary authors to present the idea of the restruc turalisation of social theory towards practice and phronesis in his analyses (Bernstein 1971; 1976; 1983) . At about the same time, Bourdieu worked on his conception on a more concrete sociological level (1977) . In our survey we will focus on another three contemporary authors.
Social Theory as Practice (Charles Taylor)
The contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor (1985, 91-115 ) studied the analysis of social theory from the point of view of practice. We need to see social theory as practice to understand its validation and not to mix it up with the verification of the theory of natural science.
Social theory is according to Taylor a kind of social practice, i.e. something that we do and create within a social context for practical rather than for theoretical or epistemological reasons. The model of natural science desires to be the norm for science as a whole but this appears to be catastrophical for the socio-human sciences just at a time when we are looking at theory as practice and are comparing it with the other practices that the theory should be leading. If we take for example physical theory, it deviates at a particular point with its abstractness from our everyday rationality and yet it helps us to cope better with reality than if we were not to have such a theory. This leads to a tendency toward analogous procedures in the case of social theory:
There is a constant temptation to take natural science theory as a model for social theory: that is, to see theory as offering an account of underlying processes and mechanisms of society, and as providing the basis of a more effective planning of social life. But for all the superficial analogies, social theory can never really occupy this role. It is part of a significantly different activity (ibid., 92).
This explanatory analogy between physical and social theory has to be recognized, but there is also a large difference. As for the questions that are being raised in social theory, people have their own, pre-theoretical (pre-scientific or extra-scientific) pre-understandings and self-interpretations that never die out:
There is always a pre-theoretical understanding of what is going on among the members of a society, which is formulated in the descriptions of self and other which are involved in the institutions and practices of that society. A society is among other things a set of institutions and practices, and these cannot exist and be carries on without certain self-understandings (ibid., 93).
This common understanding is part of and a product of social practice. For instance, during the elections, social actors not only act but they also know what they are doing and what they should do. Social practices or social action require self-interpretation which is constitutive for them. It is not pre-theoretical because it cannot not have its source in theory but because it does not rely on theory or on any theoretical formulation for example in terms of formality, systemization, etc. Social theory arises when "we try to formulate explicitly what we are doing, describe the activity which is central to practice, and articulate the norms which are essential to it" (ibid., 93). Social theory is, however, also created from other motives, not only that of trying to make practice explicit and its self-knowledge implicit; it may also be an extension, criticism or replacement of self-knowledge, which can be mistaken and insufficient (ibid., 94).
There are various types of social theories; each of them makes sense when it reveals another consciousness, deeper than the common practical one. All these theories elucidate social events, they tell us what's going on and what's the matter-this is what they have in common and this is the way in which they do not differ from the theories of natural science; the difference becomes evident when these theories come into contact with common understanding and they have to replace it or to rely on other social practices in a different way. This is where we see that both the object and the goal of these theories depend on people. Some theories, for instance those that are critical or Marxist, are based on the fact that practical human consciousness is false, reversed, and ideological. Theory also reveals or points to phenomena, connections, or concepts, which actors cannot see from their position or interest, for example, the common good, public interest, ecological crisis, etc. Social theory understood in this way does not only have an explanatory function but also other, practical functions and can ultimately change social practice. Different theories have different impacts on social practices.
The theory can affect practice but it cannot replace or completely determine or control it-there is always a difference between theory and practice. That is the difference between the theory of natural science and social theory, since the latter is a theory about practice which is partly constituted by self-interpretation. Social theory affects this self-interpretation and thus also affects practice. In this sense, social theory can create and transform its object-it is not an object that is independent as that found in natural science. In other words:
... while natural science theory also transforms practice, the practice it transforms is not what the theory is about. It is in this sense external to the theory. We think of it as an "application" of the theory. But in politics, the practice is the object of theory. Theory in this domain transforms its own object (ibid., 101).
This conception of social theory does not resign the problem of validation (verification or validity determination), but requires a different approach. According to the classical principle of correspondence, as is the case with the theory of natural science, verification is not possible-with the possible exception of some economic theories. However, economic theories are also conditioned by culture, e.g. the validity of an economic theory has a cultural background (ibid., 102-103). The model of the theory of natural science as the theory of an independent object or a theory independent of self-interpretation is basically not suitable for social theory. Social theory cannot be adequate when it corresponds to its object or facts because it is the practice and its parts (activities, institutions, norms) that is the object and its parts do not change and the theory itself can have some bearing on them:
Put tersely, our social theories can be validated, because they can be tested in practice. If theory can transform practice, then it can be tested in the quality of the practice it informs. What makes a theory right is that it brings practice out in the clear; that its adoption makes possible what is in some sense a more effective practice (ibid., 104).
It is crucial to examine the ways in which the theory is used and applied. The point is what is the goal and purpose of our theory-do we want to change or maintain, improve or develop the particular praxis and practices? According to Taylor, ... social theory can affect practice, just because it can alter our self-descriptions, and our self-descriptions can be constitutive of our practices. One of the things social theory does, I suggested, is make explicit the self-understanding which constitute our social life (ibid., 104-105).
Our civilization and culture are both very "theoretical" particularly given the high prestige which science is accorded. We are even witness to fights as to which of the theories will win and have an impact on social practice and life. Members of this civilization refer therefore to theories, they look for and create them, they believe in and rely on them, they seek to explicate and define all on the basis of scientific theories. This encompasses the fact that people validate social theories not only for their true description or explanation but also because these theories orient them and legitimize their practices and life. Despite this, social theories do not only express interests but they can also be tested from the perspective of truthfulness. Practice tests theory according to whether and how it corresponds to it. For example, if we have a notion that is not adequate, practice will disprove it by showing that it will not work, i.e. bad practice that does not work is evidence that it is based on the wrong concept or theory (ibid., 109). That means that practice can decide if there are two competing conceptions of the same subject (e.g. freedom), about the adequacy of one of them; it cannot decide, however, if there are two different conceptions of the different notion. It is like having two different maps of the same terrain-in the end we will see which of them is better when they are used in practice (ibid., 110-111).
The goal of social theory is to better understand what we do and this better understanding will enable us to act better. Good theory makes possible good practice because "theories which are about practices are self-definitions, and hence alter the practices, the proof of the validity of a theory can come in the changed quality of the practice it enables" (ibid., 111). The criterion and test of a good theory is that it enables better practice, whereas bad theory leads to self-destructive practice (ibid., 113).
The testing of social theories is thus always a matter of practice. However, social theories cannot be simply mechanically applied in practice and tested by practice. The majority of social theories merely affects and saturates practice. In such cases a simple verification is not possible (ibid., 114).
Practice Theory (Theodore Schatzki)
Practice theory is one of the new contemporary approaches in the socio-human sciences that is developing dynamically. According to this theory the key to socio-human knowledge is the understanding of specific (concrete) social practices within all their contexts. The sources of this theory are relatively well identified: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard in philosophy, Garfinkel, Bourdieu and Giddens in sociology; followed in different ways by C. Taylor, H. Dreyfus, B. Latour, E. Laclau, C. Mouffe, etc. Another source is also the philosophy of classical and current pragmatism with its idea of anti-representationism.
The concept of "theory" is evidently not understood here as a formalized system of statements (hypotheses, explanations, and predictions) that are being tested in practicewhether scientific or social-but rather as the "study" of concrete cases, the creation of models, conceptual frames or genealogies (Stern 2003, 187) , as Heideggerian "existential analytics" or Wittgensteinian description. The attitude to a traditional understanding of theory is very reserved here and it is corroborated by a specific orientation to practice. According to this "theory", practice cannot be fully reduced to theory; a systematic theory of practice is not possible either; therefore, we have to bear in mind that "theory" has a different meaning here than in classical socio-human sciences. The issue is not so much the theory of various practices but the variety of their analyses or "discourses about practice".
One of the leading authors of "practice theory" is the contemporary American philosopher T. Schatzki. Schatzki (2006) builds his project of "practice theory" upon the "new societal social ontology". Its ambition is to overcome the dualism of ontological individualism/holism on the fundamental question of the structure and character of social reality. Schatzki calls this new ontology "site ontology" 6 The site is a type of context in which social life takes place, i.e. human coexistence. The site includes a context and social entities as its parts. Social events can only be analyzed through an analysis of this site. The first step is to define the type of site; then we define its components, such as place, time, type of activities and a set of phenomena, whose part is a particular social phenomenon (Schatzki 2006, 1) .
This ontology is a critical follow-up to (in addition to others) C. Taylor (1985, 30) ; according to whom, social reality is a set of practices. Practices are a central component in the site where people live in mutual relationships. There are organized human activities, e.g. religious, political, economic, military, sports, relaxation, etc. Their organization involves sets of meanings, rules, and goals of a particular type (e.g. banking practices). These practices cannot be explained merely on the basis of the properties of their actors, individuals, or their mentalities, intentions, etc. Practices create a holistic, interactive formation "by reference to which other social entities such as actions, institutions, and structures are to be understood" (Schatzki 1996, 11) .
Practice theory places practices at the centre of the socio-human sciences instead of traditional structures, systems, events, actions. None of the practices can be reduced to a sum of its elements, which are of a complex character: they are mental and material, factual and relational, human and material, individual and supra-individual, etc. This conception also overcomes the dualism action/structure, since each action takes place within some practices, which can be relatively exactly localized and typologised, etc. Each practice then operates in a typical regime, according to particular scenarios, it has its inherent normativity, etc. An interesting issue is undoubtedly the fact that the particular types of practices are interlinked, intertwined. In this case it is a "field of practices" defined as "a total nexus of interwoven human practices" (Schatzki, Konorr Cetina, von Savigny 2001, 2) . The prioritization of practices to their components, particularly those such as their actors and their action based on mental representations (desires, intentions, reasons, etc.) , places this theory in the context of the "post-humanistic" theories (ibid., 9). Practice theory shows that the human elements of social systems are not always determining and have to rely on extra-human elements, particularly those such as their own human products.
So far, there is no uniform definition of practices. Practices may include ... activity, praxis, performance, use, language-game, customs, habit, skill, know-how, equipment, habitus, tacit knowledge, presupposition, rule, norm, institution, paradigm, framework, tradition, conceptual scheme, worldview, background, and world-picture (Stern 2003, 186 ).
According to Schatzki, practices are a matrix of activities (an array) that are interconnected through external organization and a common "field" or "subject" but also through an implicit understanding. Organization implies the arrangement-configuration-of elements within practices (particularly those such as meanings, goals and rules), not necessarily their regularity or "patterns". All social practices contain self-interpretation as their constitutive part and owing to this, organization also means the self-organization of practices. Practices have an important bodily aspect that includes not only the "functioning" of the body but also body forming (e.g. Foucault's concept of discipline). Another essential element of each practice is the "practical method" in terms of "know-how", i.e. the procedure for maintaining and/or developing the particular practice. In this sense practice theory shows some affinity with Kotarbinski's praxiology and Schatzki uses this term.
The ambitions of this approach are crucial. Schatzki understands social reality as an interwoven web of a variety of social practices; in this way he wants to re-formulate answers to the key issues of the socio-human sciences, such as action, subjectivity, rationality, normativity, language, power, science, organization, reproduction and the transformation of social life. He seeks to show that all social phenomena can be analyzed as parts of social practices and/or their fields in mutual interaction; that all social phenomena are created by social practices and depend on them (e.g. the type of rationality is a matter of social practice since in reality it works only within it). Social practices are not closed social entities, but they are open to macro-social determination as well as to micro-social creation. That means that within social practices, features of the overall social order and individual interventions of actors can be studied. This approach offers a very dynamic image of social reality. However, from the methodological perspective, there is no particular method that would control practice theory and it is questionable whether such a method is at all possible and considered necessary. 7 
Phronetic Social Science (Bent Flyvbjerg)
The contemporary Danish social scientist Bent Flyvbjerg (2001) introduced a radical conception of social science building consistently on Aristotelian phronesis. 8 According to him phronesis is a built-in social practice (practices), and therefore "attempts to reduce social science and theory either to episteme or techne, or to comprehend them in those terms, are misguided" (ibid., 2). The social sciences, however, forgot Aristotle's phronesis and set itself an impossible task: to emulate natural science by its theory and compete with it in terms of epistemic qualities. The role of the social sciences is different and consists in phronesis-in the analysis of values and interests and in providing the foundations for social development (ibid., 3). Flyvbjerg sees the fact that neither the classical Aristotelian concept of phronesis nor its contemporary versions, e.g. that of Gadamerian, incorporated a reflection of power and conflict as constitutive social phenomena as one of the causes of this development. Flyvbjerg's goal is to work out such a conception of phronesis and he aims to ... help restore social science to its classical position as a practical, intellectual activity aimed at clarifying the problems, risks, and possibilities we face as humans and societies, and at contributing to social and political praxis (ibid., 4).
The imitation of the natural and technical sciences based on cognitivism and naturalism led the main stream social sciences down a blind alley. That is why their re-orientation on the basis of the conception of phronesis is necessary. This project of the reformation of the social sciences should lead to the formation of the "phronetic social science" (ibid., [4] [5] .
Also this conception shows that practice is the subject of social theory. This fact determines the basic form of social theory and its objectives. Social theory can employ the universal procedures of sciences, e.g. abstraction, but it can never be abstract itself. In no way can social theory be abstracted from the context; from a particular social situation, in which actors act; from the conditions and background of the action. Social theory cannot reduce its subject (practice) to a set of rules, norms or principles and laws. Studies of the history of the socio-human sciences show that they are not developing in a cumulative manner and that neither Kuhn's model of "normal science" nor his paradigm is valid for them. The socio-human sciences are developing in different cycles or regimes; these are allied with the cycles of practice itself and are not foreseeable. Their particular stages remind us instead of a "fashion" in the form of the prevailing discourses, the permanent reorganization and plurality of trends; therefore, it is not possible to determine the stage of "crisis" manifest in these sciences according to clear-cut criteria. Obviously, the socio-human sciences study practice on the basis of the situational self-interpretations of actors (ibid., 40-47) .
This self-reflection of the socio-human sciences has to lead to their re-orientation, that means to the focus-ensuing from the character of the subject, namely a concrete social practice in all its contexts-on those procedures and goals that will show where their strengths and not their weaknesses lie (ibid., 53). These sciences should not focus on an epistemic ideal formulated in a Platonic way and in the name of the unified science as knowledge out of context but on their uniqueness: on a value analysis as the bases and objectives of action. This in fact is the focus on phronesis since phronesis is the "intellectual activity most relevant to praxis" (ibid., 57). Social theory need not be practiced as episteme but as phronesis or techne. In this role, social theory will show its advantages and strengths: its concentration on value analysis, the actual life of human beings, their practices, case studies, dialogues, stories, etc. Social theory should not only hold up a mirror to its subjectsocial practice-but also facilitate its reflection and self-reflection (ibid., 61-63). 9 Another dictionary would define such an orientation of social theory for example as the "involvement" of the socio-human sciences with particular values. Flyvbjerg (ibid., 53) expresses explicitly the contemporary social and civilization mission of these sciences by means of "balancing instrumental rationality with value-rationality" , i.e. he sees it in the priority development of the value rationality that belongs to the domain of phronesis.
In classical phronetic studies, Flyvbjerg focuses on three questions: (1) Where are we going? (2) Is this development desirable? (3) What should we do about it? Since classical phronesis has not yet incorporated the concept of power, he adds a fourth question: (4) Who gains and who loses and by which mechanisms of power? (ibid., 60). The concept of power that is relevant and compatible to phronesis is Foucault's concept of power as power relations and the process that does not orient itself towards a substantial examination of the question "What is power" but towards the mechanisms of "how" power works, shows itself, asserts itself, etc. Foucault's analysis of power, and indeed almost all his work, is another example of phronetic social science since it operates in the Aristotelian, particularist (antiuniversalist) and contextualist tradition with the focus on concrete practices, on the "complex configuration of social realities", on "daily practice", etc. It is an approach which understands "strength" and the meaning of the particular example-it uses the analytical method of case studies-which is another attribute of phronesis. 10 9 Flyvbjerg presents an interesting work about American cultural identity (R. Bellah et al. 1985) as an example of such a phronetic social science. 10 Other examples of social research from the position of phronesis introduced by Flyvbjerg (2001, 162-165) are the works of Bourdieu, B. Latour, P. Rabinov, J. Butler, etc.
The idea of phronetic social theory is analytical and discursive rather than a theoretical and methodological project. The point is "pragmatically governed interpretations of studied practices". In spite of the fact that emphasis is laid on "concrete examples and detailed narratives how power works" (ibid., 140), such an approach does not enclose itself in particularity and does not isolate itself from the major problems of social practice, such as for example the imbalance between instrumental and value rationality or global rationalization and the abuse of power (ibid., 107). The ambitions of phronetic social theory are rather strong: in the domain of science it is an attempt to "regenerate the strength and efficiency of the social sciences". To achieve this, it is necessary: 1. to terminate the unproductive imitation of the natural sciences; 2. to solve relevant questions; 3. to concentrate on an analysis of values and power. The objectives of this science ... is not to develop theory, but to contribute to society's practical rationality in elucidating where we are, where we want to go, and what is desirable according to diverse sets of values and interests (Flyvbjerg 2001, 167) .
Conclusion
The contemporary "practice turn" in social sciences is a turn towards practice understood as a plurality of the "configurations of practices" that are "patterns" of social life (human coexistence). Practice is neither necessarily or primarily a product nor the application of scientific theory. Practice composed of concrete practices is a sufficiently relevant and sovereign subject of investigation that does not need any prerequisites and is irreplaceable. The theory itself is understood as part of the practices or as a form of the practices, not as something "external" that has to find its place in praxis. It is based on the concept that theory is able to construe practice and as phronesis it is able to effectively focus on problem solving. This trend in social analyses and interpretations definitely does not solve all questions. Its aim is not to create a definite theory for "all" that is social. However, it provides enough new and interesting incentives for social theory and research to continue with the hope of achieving a real effect and sense in a particular social practice.
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